Filing a Charge With the Department of Human Rights Does Not Hand Your Case to the Department

The charge is a document with required contents, not a phone call

Chapter 363A gives a person who believes an employer violated it two starting moves, and Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 1, states both in its first sentence:

Any person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action as provided in section 363A.33, subdivision 1, or may file a verified charge with the commissioner or the commissioner’s designated agent.

There is no exhaustion requirement. You do not have to go to the Department of Human Rights before you go to court. If you do go to the Department, the same subdivision fixes what the charge has to be:

A charge filed with the commissioner must be in writing by hand, or electronically with an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury, on a form provided by the commissioner and signed by the charging party. The charge must state the name of the person alleged to have committed an unfair discriminatory practice and set out a summary of the details of the practice complained of.

Two things follow that are worth reading slowly. The commissioner “may require a charging party to provide the address of the person alleged to have committed the unfair discriminatory practice, names of witnesses, documents, and any other information necessary to process the charge” — and “[t]he commissioner may dismiss a charge when the charging party fails to provide required information.” Not answering the Department is itself a ground of dismissal, and dismissal starts a 90-day clock discussed below.

The subdivision also puts the employer on a schedule. Within ten days of the filing the commissioner “shall serve a copy of the charge and a form for use in responding to the charge upon the respondent personally, electronically with the receiving party’s consent, or by mail.” The respondent then has 30 days from receipt to file a written response summarizing its position. If it does not, and service was consistent with Rule 4 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, “the commissioner, on behalf of the complaining party, may bring an action for default in district court pursuant to rule 55.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.”

The commissioner can also start a case without anyone filing. Under subd. 2, whenever the commissioner “has reason to believe that a person is engaging in an unfair discriminatory practice, the commissioner may issue a charge stating in statutory language an alleged violation of subdivision 10 and sections 363A.08 to 363A.19.”

One year, and the clock does not care which door you pick

The filing deadline is the same for a charge and for a lawsuit. Section 363A.28, subd. 3(a):

A claim of an unfair discriminatory practice must be brought as a civil action pursuant to section 363A.33, subdivision 1, filed in a charge with a local commission pursuant to section 363A.07, subdivision 3, or filed in a charge with the commissioner within one year after the occurrence of the practice.

The suspension provisions, the start date for policies rather than incidents, and how the federal deadline runs on a separate clock are the subject of a separate page: a Minnesota discrimination claim is usually lost on the calendar. Everything below assumes the charge was filed inside that year.

Screening, priority, and the 12-month determination

The Department does not work the file in the order it arrived. Subd. 6(a) sets the duty:

Consistent with paragraph (h), the commissioner shall promptly inquire into the truth of the allegations of the charge. The commissioner shall make an immediate inquiry when a charge alleges actual or threatened physical violence. The commissioner shall also make an inquiry when it appears that a charge is frivolous or without merit and shall dismiss those charges.

Subd. 6(b) then ranks the docket. The commissioner gives priority, in this order, to charges the commissioner determines have these characteristics: evidence of irreparable harm if immediate action is not taken; evidence that the respondent intentionally engaged in a reprisal; a significant number of recent charges filed against the respondent; a government-entity respondent; potential for broadly promoting the policies of the chapter; or support by “substantial and credible documentation, witnesses, or other evidence.” The statute requires the Department to tell you where you landed: “The commissioner shall inform charging parties of these priorities and shall tell each party if their charge is a priority case or not.”

The 12-month figure is attached to what is left over:

On other charges the commissioner shall make a determination within 12 months after the charge was filed as to whether or not there is probable cause to credit the allegation of unfair discriminatory practices.

Section 363A.29, subd. 2, states the same obligation as a year and supplies the stop-clock: “The commissioner shall make a determination of probable cause or no probable cause within one year of the filing of a case in which the time has not been tolled.” The next sentence names the tolled time: “The amount of time during which a case is involved in significant settlement negotiations, is being investigated by another enforcement agency under a work sharing agreement, or has been referred to mediation or to a local human rights commission for no fault grievance processing is tolled.” Tolling during settlement negotiations “requires written approval of the charging party or the party’s attorney” — so that particular pause is one you are asked to sign off on.

Section 363A.28, subd. 6(h), leaves the sequencing to the agency: the commissioner “may adopt policies to determine which charges are processed and the order in which charges are processed based on their particular social or legal significance, administrative convenience, difficulty of resolution, or other standard consistent with the provisions of this chapter.”

Mediation is offered by statute, and it pauses the year

Subd. 5 is short and it is the paragraph the 2024 Legislature rewrote:

Charging parties and respondents shall be offered and may request an opportunity to resolve a charge through mediation or another alternative dispute resolution process. Neutrals providing mediation and alternative dispute resolution processes for parties are bound by the Code of Ethics for Court-Annexed ADR Neutrals. The running of the 12-month period during which the commissioner must make a determination of probable cause to credit allegations is suspended during a period of time specified by the commissioner during which the parties are involved in mediation or other alternative dispute resolution process that has been sanctioned by the commissioner.

The first two sentences were added by Laws 2024, ch. 105, § 13, effective August 1, 2024. Before that amendment the subdivision consisted only of the suspension sentence. Mediation is now something the Department must offer, and something either side may ask for.

Conciliation is a separate, older duty, and it sits at subd. 8:

The commissioner, in complying with subdivision 6, shall endeavor to eliminate the unfair discriminatory practice through education, conference, conciliation and persuasion at the place where the practice occurred, or the respondent resides or has a principal place of business.

Probable cause, no probable cause, and the reconsideration windows

Subd. 6(c) governs a determination that no probable cause exists. The commissioner must serve written notice on both parties “within ten days of the determination.” The charging party then has 30 days after receipt of notice to request reconsideration in writing, on department forms, and the request “shall contain a brief statement of the reasons for and new evidence in support of the request for reconsideration.” A copy goes to the respondent at the time the request goes to the commissioner. The commissioner must “reaffirm, reverse, or vacate and remand for further consideration the determination of no probable cause within 20 days after receipt of the request for reconsideration,” and must notify both parties in writing “within ten days” of that decision.

The same paragraph forecloses the appellate route:

A decision by the commissioner that no probable cause exists to credit the allegations of an unfair discriminatory practice shall not be appealed to the court of appeals pursuant to section 363A.34 or sections 14.63 to 14.68.

Subd. 6(d) runs the other way. On a probable-cause finding the commissioner serves on the respondent — and on the respondent’s attorney if there is one — “a notice setting forth a short plain written statement of the alleged facts which support the finding of probable cause and an enumeration of the provisions of law allegedly violated.” The respondent gets its own 30 days to request reconsideration. If the commissioner determines “that attempts to eliminate the alleged unfair practices through conciliation pursuant to subdivision 8 have been or would be unsuccessful or unproductive,” the commissioner may issue a complaint and a notice of hearing before an administrative law judge, set “not less than ten days after service of said complaint,” with copies to the charging party and the attorney general.

Two provisions in the same subdivision are easy to miss. Under subd. 6(e), at any time after a charge is filed the commissioner may petition district court for temporary relief, and no order beyond ten days issues except by the respondent’s consent or after notice and a hearing. Under subd. 6(g), in a complaint the commissioner “may seek relief for a class of individuals affected by an unfair discriminatory practice occurring on or after a date one year prior to the filing of the charge from which the complaint originates.”

And under subd. 9, the paperwork moves both ways: the commissioner provides the respondent a copy of the charge, and “[t]he charging party or the party’s representative may review the answer of the respondent to the charge submitted pursuant to subdivision 1.”

One nearby section is worth naming, because a reader who finds it might think this page has missed something. Section 363A.32, subd. 1, provides that “[t]he attorney general shall be the attorney for the department,” and that once “a matter has been referred to the attorney general by the commissioner after a finding of probable cause or for the purpose of interim relief, communications between members of the attorney general’s office and charging parties or members of a class formed pursuant to section 363A.28, subdivision 6, paragraph (g), are privileged as would be a communication between an attorney and a client.” Subdivision 2 speaks of “legal representation on behalf of complaining parties.” Those two subdivisions say who the department’s lawyer is, and when a privilege attaches to that lawyer’s communications with a charging party. Neither makes the commissioner the charging party’s attorney.

Getting out: 90 days, 90 days, and 45-then-90

Section 363A.33, subd. 1, opens by preserving the direct route — “The commissioner or a person may bring a civil action seeking redress for an unfair discriminatory practice directly to district court” — and then adds three windows.

• Clause (1) — dismissal. A person may sue “within 90 days after receipt of notice that the commissioner has dismissed a charge because it is frivolous or without merit, because the charging party has failed to provide required information, because the commissioner has determined that further use of department resources is not warranted, or because the commissioner has determined that there is no probable cause to credit the allegations contained in a charge filed with the commissioner.”
• Clause (2) — reconsideration. Ninety days after receipt of notice that the commissioner “has reaffirmed a determination of no probable cause if the charging party requested a reconsideration of the no probable cause determination,” or that the commissioner “has decided not to reopen a dismissed case that the charging party has asked to be reopened.” The reaffirmance route opens only where the charging party asked for the reconsideration in the first place.
• Clause (3) — a charge still pending. Suit is permitted “after 45 days from the filing of a charge pursuant to section 363A.28, subdivision 1, if a hearing has not been held pursuant to section 363A.29 or if the commissioner has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the charging party is a signator.” Then: “The charging party shall notify the commissioner of an intention to bring a civil action, which shall be commenced within 90 days of giving the notice.”

For clauses (1) and (2), “receipt of notice is presumed to be five days from the date of service by mail of the written notice.”

Clause (3) is the one that swallows claims, because 45 is not a deadline. It is the earliest day you may file. The deadline in that clause is 90 days measured from your own written notice of intent, and the notice has to come first.

The 90-day figures in clauses (1) and (2) are recent. Laws 2024, ch. 105, § 16, struck “45” and inserted “90” in both clauses, effective August 1, 2024. Material written before that date — and material written since that copied it — puts 45 days there. The statute now says 90.

Choosing one forum closes another

Section 363A.07, subd. 3, governs the choice between a local human rights commission and the Department:

The charging party has the option of filing a charge either with a local commission or the department. Notwithstanding the provisions of any ordinance or resolution to the contrary, a charge may be filed with a local commission within one year after the occurrence of the practice. The exercise of such choice in filing a charge with one agency shall preclude the option of filing the same charge with the other agency.

The same subdivision requires the local agency to inform the charging party of that option, and — “[w]here this chapter provides additional protections and remedies not provided for under a local antidiscrimination ordinance” — to advise the party of those and of the option to file under chapter 363A.

Going to court ends the administrative case. Under § 363A.33, subd. 3, a charging party who sues must mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the commissioner by registered or certified mail, or electronically with consent, “and upon their receipt the commissioner shall terminate all proceedings in the department relating to the charge.” No charge may be filed or reinstituted afterward “unless the civil action has been dismissed without prejudice.”

And § 363A.04 makes the administrative track exclusive while it is running:

[A]s to acts declared unfair by sections 363A.08 to 363A.19, and 363A.28, subdivision 10, the administrative procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive. The rights and remedies herein provided are in addition to, and shall not preclude, those available at law or in equity.

The second of those sentences is new: Laws 2024, ch. 105, § 6, added it, and inserted the word “administrative” before “procedure” in the first. Both changes took effect August 1, 2024.

What each forum can order

The remedies differ by where the case ends up, and since 2024 they are written out in both places rather than borrowed by cross-reference.

Before an administrative law judge. Under § 363A.29, subd. 3, an ALJ who finds an unfair discriminatory practice issues an order to cease and desist and “to take such affirmative action as in the judgment of the administrative law judge will effectuate the purposes of this chapter,” and that order “shall be a final decision of the department.” Under subd. 4(a), the ALJ must order a civil penalty paid to the state, must order compensatory damages “in an amount up to three times the actual damages sustained,” and may order “damages for mental anguish or suffering and reasonable attorney’s fees, in addition to punitive damages in an amount not more than $25,000 pursuant to section 549.20.” Under subd. 5(1), in an employment case the ALJ may order “the hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of an aggrieved party,” with or without back pay, restoration to a labor organization, admission to training programs, “or any other relief the administrative law judge deems just and equitable.” Under subd. 8, if the respondent is subject to the licensing or regulatory power of the state or a political subdivision, the administrative law judge determines that it engaged in a discriminatory practice, and the respondent “does not cease to engage in such discriminatory practice,” the commissioner “may so certify to the licensing or regulatory agency.” Under subd. 9, for a respondent that is a party to a public contract, the determination alone is enough — the commissioner “may so certify to the contract letting agency,” and the subdivision attaches no requirement that the practice continue. What the receiving agency may then do is spelled out in each. Subdivision 8:

Unless such determination of discriminatory practice is reversed in the course of judicial review, a final determination is binding on the licensing or regulatory agency. Such agency may take appropriate administrative action, including suspension or revocation of the respondent’s license or certificate of public convenience and necessity, if the agency is otherwise authorized to take such action.

Subdivision 9 is parallel: “Unless the finding of a discriminatory practice is reversed in the course of judicial review, a final determination is binding on the contract letting agency and the agency may take appropriate administrative action, including the imposition of financial penalties or termination of the contract, in whole or in part, if the agency is otherwise authorized to take the action.”

In district court. Under § 363A.33, subd. 6, a person bringing the action “or a respondent is entitled to a jury trial.” Under subd. 8(a), the court orders a civil penalty to the state, “shall order the respondent to pay an aggrieved party who has suffered discrimination compensatory damages, including mental anguish or suffering, in an amount up to three times the actual damages sustained,” and may order punitive damages under Minn. Stat. § 549.20; “[i]n any case under this chapter that is decided by a jury, the jury shall determine the amount of all damages to be awarded.” Under subd. 9(1), employment relief includes hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading with or without back pay, union or apprenticeship remedies, and “any other relief the court deems just and equitable.” Under subd. 7, the court “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”

Both § 363A.29, subd. 4(b), and § 363A.33, subd. 8(b), cap punitive damages against a political subdivision at $25,000.

One currency note on the hearing provision. The Revisor currently publishes the 2025 edition of the statutes, so the posted text of § 363A.29, subd. 1, does not show the 2026 amendment. Laws 2026, ch. 97, art. 13, § 1, rewrote it: the commissioner “shall decide within 30 days whether to forward the request for hearing” to the Court of Administrative Hearings — the same section struck “Office” and inserted “Court” in that name, carrying through the rename made by Laws 2025, ch. 39, art. 2, §§ 17 and 68 — and the sentence fixing the hearing’s location within the county where the practice occurred or the respondent resides or does business was struck. Chapter 97 contains no effective-date clause for that article and makes no appropriation; under Minn. Stat. § 645.02 an act without a specified date “takes effect on August 1 next following its final enactment,” at 12:01 a.m. The governor signed chapter 97 on May 18, 2026, so the amended subdivision took effect August 1, 2026.

The federal charge is a different filing in a different office

A charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is not a chapter 363A charge, its deadlines are federal, and nothing in § 363A.28, subd. 3, suspends the Minnesota year because a federal charge exists. That machinery is set out on the calendar page.

Which of these windows is open on a particular charge, on a particular date, depends on what the Department did with the paperwork and when it served notice. Reading those dates off a specific file is not what this page does.