Minnesota Employment GuideMinnesota employment law, for employees
Minnesota Employment Guide is a publication of Madgett Law, LLC. It is general information about Minnesota law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether any of it applies to your job turns on facts this site cannot know. This is attorney advertising.

Guide

Every Minnesota Employment Deadline in One Table — and Not One of Them Is the Same Number

One year for the Human Rights Act, six for a whistleblower report, two for wages, forty-five days for an unemployment appeal, fifteen working days for the termination-reason letter. Each row here is quoted from the statute or the decision that sets it.

Nothing on this page is advice about your job, and no article can be. If you want your own facts looked at, a Minnesota employment attorney can do that — and several of the deadlines described on this site are short enough that waiting is itself a decision.

One page, one row per claim

Employment claims in Minnesota are lost on the calendar more often than on the facts, and the reason is structural: there is no general employment statute of limitations. Each claim carries its own period, measured from its own event, in its own unit — calendar days, working days, or years. A table is the honest format.

Every figure below was taken from the statute or the opinion cited in the same row, retrieved on September 7, 2026, except the two chapter 15C rows, retrieved on September 9, 2026. Where a period could not be verified from a retrieved source, the cell says so.

The table

Claim Deadline Runs from Source
Minnesota Human Rights Act — discrimination or reprisal (civil action, local commission charge, or charge with the commissioner) 1 year, suspended in the circumstances named in subd. 3(b) and (c) “the occurrence of the practice” Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3(a)–(c)
MHRA — civil action after the commissioner dismisses a charge 90 days “receipt of notice” of the dismissal; receipt “presumed to be five days from the date of service by mail” § 363A.33, subd. 1(1) and closing sentence
MHRA — civil action after reaffirmance of a no-probable-cause determination, or a decision not to reopen 90 days receipt of that notice; same five-day mail presumption § 363A.33, subd. 1(2)
MHRA — civil action on a charge still pending at the department 45 days is a waiting period, then 90 days to sue 45 days “from the filing of a charge”; the 90 days runs from giving the commissioner notice of intent to sue § 363A.33, subd. 1(3)
MHRA — rescinding a signed waiver or release of chapter 363A rights 15 calendar days “its execution” § 363A.31, subd. 2
Title VII charge with the EEOC 300 days where the person aggrieved “has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency”; 180 days otherwise; or 30 days after notice that the state or local agency terminated proceedings, whichever is earlier “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)
Title VII civil action after a right-to-sue notice 90 days “the giving of such notice” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
ADEA charge with the EEOC 300 days in a case to which 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) applies, or 30 days after receipt of notice of termination of state proceedings, whichever is earlier; 180 days otherwise “after the alleged unlawful practice occurred” 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)
ADEA civil action after notice 90 days “the date of the receipt of such notice” 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)
ADA — employment discrimination The Title VII procedures, including its charge and suit periods as under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)
Minnesota Whistleblower Act — report claim, Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1) 6 years accrual — see the note below the table Ford v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 874 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 2016); Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2)
Whistleblower — refusal claim, § 181.932, subd. 1(3) [UNVERIFIED] — Ford decided subdivision 1(1) and did not decide subdivision 1(3) — see the note below the table
Minnesota False Claims Act — retaliation, Minn. Stat. § 15C.145 3 years “the date when the retaliation occurred” Minn. Stat. § 15C.145(c)
Minnesota False Claims Act — action under the chapter, including a qui tam action 3 years from discovery by the prosecuting attorney or 6 years after the fraudulent activity, “whichever occurs later,” but “in no event more than ten years after the date on which the violation is committed” “the date of discovery of the fraudulent activity by the prosecuting attorney”; “after the fraudulent activity occurred” Minn. Stat. § 15C.11(a)
Wage claims — recovery of wages, overtime, damages, fees, or penalties under any wage-payment law, including §§ 181.13 and 181.14 2 years; 3 years if the employer fails to submit payroll records on request of the Department of Labor and Industry, or if the nonpayment “is willful and not the result of mistake or inadvertence” accrual of the action Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5)
Final-paycheck penalty — discharged employee Employer is in default 24 hours after a written demand; penalty accrues at average daily earnings “for each day up to 15 days” of default the employee’s written demand Minn. Stat. § 181.13(a)
Final-paycheck penalty — employee who quit Wages due by the first regularly scheduled payday after the final day (second payday if the first is under 5 calendar days out, never past 20 calendar days); then default 24 hours after written demand, penalty up to 15 days the final day of employment, then the written demand Minn. Stat. § 181.14, subds. 1(a), 2
Unemployment — appeal from a determination of eligibility or ineligibility 45 calendar days “after sending” Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f)
Unemployment — appeal from a determination of benefit account 45 calendar days “after the sending of the determination or amended determination” Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 3a(a)
Unemployment — request for reconsideration of a judge’s decision 45 calendar days “the sending of the unemployment law judge’s decision under subdivision 1a” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(a)
Unemployment — certiorari to the Minnesota Court of Appeals 45 calendar days, plus 3 if the decision was mailed “the sending of the unemployment law judge’s decision on reconsideration” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(a)
Termination-reason request to the employer 15 working days (employer then has 10 working days from receipt to answer in writing) “following such termination” Minn. Stat. § 181.933, subd. 1
Personnel-record request Employer must comply within 7 working days of receipt if the record is in Minnesota, 14 working days if outside; the requester must have been separated less than one year to be an “employee” receipt of the written request; separation, for the one-year eligibility limit Minn. Stat. § 181.961, subd. 2(a); § 181.960, subd. 2
Workers’ compensation retaliation, Minn. Stat. § 176.82 6 years accrual of the action McDaniel v. United Hardware Distributing Co., 469 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 1991); Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2)
42 U.S.C. § 1983 6 years accrual of the action Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)
Common-law wrongful discharge (the Phipps refusal claim) [UNVERIFIED] — see the note below the table — —
FLSA — unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime, or liquidated damages 2 years; 3 years for “a cause of action arising out of a willful violation” “after the cause of action accrued” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)
Trade-secret misappropriation (a claim an employer brings, on this same calendar) 3 years; “a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim” when the misappropriation “is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered” Minn. Stat. § 325C.06

The three rows that need more than a cell

The whistleblower report claim, and the clause Ford did not reach. The Minnesota Supreme Court took the question directly. Reading Sipe, Phipps, and Dukowitz v. Hannon Security Services, 841 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. 2014), together, it concluded that “the cause of action created by section 181.932, subdivision 1(1), has no counterpart in Minnesota common law,” Ford v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 874 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. 2016), and held that “Ford’s cause of action for violation of subdivision 1(1) of the MWA is governed by the 6-year statute of limitations found in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2).” Id. at 234. In a footnote it cleaned up the contrary authority: “To the extent that Larson suggests that all claims under the MWA are subject to the 2-year statute of limitations in section 541.07(1), Larson is overruled.” Id. at 234 n.2.

Read the scope of that as narrowly as the court wrote it. Ford decided subdivision 1(1) — the report clause. The employer in Ford argued to the court that it would be anomalous for a subdivision 1(3) claim to carry two years while a subdivision 1(1) claim carried six, and the court answered that its decision rested on the text of the applicable statutes and on controlling precedent, and that the policy arguments were for the Legislature. Id. at 234. It did not decide the subdivision 1(3) period, and this page does not supply one. The framework that would govern the question is stated in Sipe v. STS Manufacturing, Inc., 834 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013): “we conclude that section 541.07(1) is limited to common law causes of action not created by statute.” Subdivision 1 of section 181.932 was reenacted in full by Laws 2025, ch. 39, art. 2, § 57, which is the current source of its text; that act changed only clause (6), and clauses (1) through (5) are unchanged. The substance of the clauses is worked through in the Whistleblower Act guide.

The common-law claim from Phipps. A search of Minnesota appellate decisions on CourtListener turns up none holding what limitations period governs the common-law wrongful-discharge claim recognized in Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987). The two decisions that frame the question point in the same direction without answering it: Sipe confines § 541.07(1) to “common law causes of action not created by statute,” 834 N.W.2d at 686, and Ford describes the Phipps claim as a common-law cause of action, 874 N.W.2d at 233. That is a framework, not a holding, and the cell above says [UNVERIFIED] rather than doing the arithmetic the courts have not done.

Six years for § 1983, from a state appellate decision. Berg v. Groschen applied Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989), to Minnesota’s two personal-injury periods and concluded: “Under the Supreme Court’s directive, we designate the six-year limitations period in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) as the applicable statutory limitations period for section 1983 claims.” 437 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). This page reports what Berg held. It does not survey how federal courts sitting in Minnesota have applied the period since.

The wage row, quoted

Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5) is the row people misremember most often. Both numbers are in the section, but not in the same place: the two years is in the section’s lead-in, and the clause supplies only the three-year exception.

Except where the Uniform Commercial Code, this section, section 541.05, 541.073, 541.076, or 604.205 otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within two years:

…

(5) for the recovery of wages or overtime or damages, fees, or penalties accruing under any federal or state law respecting the payment of wages or overtime or damages, fees, or penalties except, that if the employer fails to submit payroll records by a specified date upon request of the Department of Labor and Industry or if the nonpayment is willful and not the result of mistake or inadvertence, the limitation is three years. (The term “wages” means all remuneration for services or employment, including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium other than cash, where the relationship of master and servant exists and the term “damages” means single, double, or treble damages, accorded by any statutory cause of action whatsoever and whether or not the relationship of master and servant exists)

Two triggers for the three-year period, not one, and they are disjunctive: a failure to submit payroll records on the Department’s request, or willful nonpayment “not the result of mistake or inadvertence.” The definitional parenthetical is part of the clause and is doing work — “damages” reaches “single, double, or treble damages, accorded by any statutory cause of action whatsoever.”

The federal wage period is separate and differently worded. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) applies to an action “to enforce any cause of action for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,” and provides that such an action “may be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued.”

What suspends a clock, and what does not

Only one of the periods above has a suspension mechanism written into the section that sets it. The rows that take their period from chapter 541 — the whistleblower report claim, the workers’ compensation retaliation claim, the § 1983 claim, and the wage claim — are also subject to that chapter’s two general provisions: Minn. Stat. § 541.15 suspends “the running of the period of limitation” during a listed disability, including that “the plaintiff is within the age of 18 years” and “the plaintiff’s insanity” — a suspension the same paragraph caps at five years, except for infancy, and at one year after the disability ceases — and Minn. Stat. § 541.13 provides that where a defendant departs and resides out of the state and is not subject to process here, “the time of the person’s absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.” The same sentence covers the mirror situation — a defendant who was already out of state when the claim accrued — by providing that “an action may be commenced within the times herein limited after the person’s return to the state.” This page does not say how either provision interacts with the Human Rights Act period or with the federal rows; no retrieved source decides that.

Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3(b), suspends the Human Rights Act’s one year:

The running of the one-year limitation period is suspended during the time a potential charging party and respondent are voluntarily engaged in a dispute resolution process involving a claim of unlawful discrimination under this chapter, including arbitration, conciliation, mediation or grievance procedures pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement or statutory, charter, ordinance provisions for a civil service or other employment system or a school board sexual harassment or sexual violence policy.

The paperwork burden sits on the employer. A potential respondent that participates “shall notify the department and the charging party in writing of the participation in the process and the date the process commenced,” and shall give notice of the ending date; a respondent that does not “is barred from raising the defense that the statute of limitations has run unless one year plus a period of time equal to the suspension period has passed.” Paragraph (c) adds a second suspension, for the period under § 363A.331, subd. 2, during which an architectural-barrier action may not be brought. Those two are the whole list, and how far the first one reaches is covered in the discrimination-deadline guide.

Two provisions that are not suspensions but change a start date are worth keeping next to it. Section 363A.28, subd. 4, provides that “the first application of an unfair discriminatory practice, employment policy, or seniority system to a new person establishes a basis for the filing of a claim by that person.” And § 363A.33, subd. 1, presumes receipt of a mailed notice at five days from service for clauses (1) and (2).

The claim: "You have two years for everything in employment law."

That is false, in both directions, and the table above is why. Two years is the wage-claim period in Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5) and the ordinary FLSA period in 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). It is not the Human Rights Act period, which is one year from the occurrence of the practice under Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3(a), suspended in the circumstances named in subd. 3(b) and (c). It is not the whistleblower report-claim period, which is six years — Ford v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 874 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 2016) — and Ford expressly overruled Larson "[t]o the extent that Larson suggests that all claims under the MWA are subject to the 2-year statute of limitations in section 541.07(1)." Id. at 234 n.2. It is not the workers' compensation retaliation period, which is six years. McDaniel v. United Hardware Distributing Co., 469 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 1991). And it is not any of the unemployment deadlines, which are 45 calendar days. A claim held for eighteen months on the strength of "two years" may be nine months late or four and a half years early, depending entirely on which claim it is.

The claim: "The 45 days on my unemployment appeal runs from the day I got the letter."

The statute does not measure it from receipt. Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f), makes a determination of eligibility or ineligibility final "unless an appeal is filed by the applicant or employer within 45 calendar days after sending," and § 268.105, subd. 1a(c), directs the unemployment law judge to dismiss an appeal as untimely if it "was not filed within 45 calendar days after the sending of the determination." Section 268.105, subd. 2(a), and § 268.07, subd. 3a(a), are drafted the same way. One deadline in chapter 268 adds mailing time and it is the last one: under § 268.105, subd. 7(a), a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Minnesota Court of Appeals is due within 45 calendar days "of the sending of the unemployment law judge's decision on reconsideration," and "[t]hree days are added to the 45-calendar-day period if the decision on reconsideration was mailed to the parties." Reading the mailing allowance into the earlier deadlines is not something the chapter's text supports.

What this page does not do

This page collects deadlines. It does not decide which of them applies to a given set of facts, and that determination is frequently the whole case — the same discharge can carry a one-year Human Rights Act period, a six-year whistleblower period, a two-year wage period, and a 45-day unemployment appeal, all running at once from different events. Two of the rows are marked [UNVERIFIED] because no retrieved source decides them, and a period that is not in a statute or a decision is not a period this page will estimate. Whether a particular firing was unlawful at all is a separate question, and pinning down the date the clock started often begins with the termination-reason letter and the personnel file.

Common questions

What is the statute of limitations for employment claims in Minnesota?
There is no single one. A Minnesota Human Rights Act claim is one year from the occurrence of the practice under Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3(a), and that year is suspended in the circumstances named in paragraphs (b) and (c) of the same subdivision. A whistleblower claim for a report under Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1), is six years, Ford v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 874 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 2016). A wage claim is two years, or three where the nonpayment is willful, under Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5). An unemployment appeal is 45 calendar days after sending under Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f). A workers' compensation retaliation claim under Minn. Stat. § 176.82 is six years, McDaniel v. United Hardware Distributing Co., 469 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 1991). The numbers do not borrow from each other.
How long do I have to file an EEOC charge if I work in Minnesota?
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), a Title VII charge must be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, extended to 300 days 'in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice,' or within 30 days after receiving notice that the state or local agency terminated its proceedings, whichever is earlier. After the EEOC gives notice, § 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a civil action 'within ninety days after the giving of such notice.' The ADEA runs the same two figures through 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1), and the ADA borrows the Title VII procedures through 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
Is the Minnesota whistleblower statute of limitations two years or six?
For the report claim, six. In Ford v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 874 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 2016), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a claim under Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1), is 'upon a liability created by statute' and therefore governed by the six-year period in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2), and it overruled Larson v. New Richland Care Center '[t]o the extent that Larson suggests that all claims under the MWA are subject to the 2-year statute of limitations in section 541.07(1).' Id. at 234 & n.2. Ford decided subdivision 1(1). It did not decide the period for a refusal claim under subdivision 1(3).
Does the 45-day unemployment deadline run from when I received the decision?
No. Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f), makes a determination final 'unless an appeal is filed by the applicant or employer within 45 calendar days after sending.' Section 268.105, subd. 2(a), uses the same construction for a request for reconsideration — 45 calendar days 'of the sending' of the unemployment law judge's decision. Only the certiorari deadline adds mailing time: under § 268.105, subd. 7(a), '[t]hree days are added to the 45-calendar-day period if the decision on reconsideration was mailed to the parties.'
How long do I have to sue for unpaid wages in Minnesota?
Two years, or three in two named situations. Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5) covers an action 'for the recovery of wages or overtime or damages, fees, or penalties accruing under any federal or state law respecting the payment of wages or overtime or damages, fees, or penalties,' and extends the period to three years 'if the employer fails to submit payroll records by a specified date upon request of the Department of Labor and Industry or if the nonpayment is willful and not the result of mistake or inadvertence.' The federal wage-and-hour period in 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) is a separate two years, three for a willful violation.

Sources checked September 9, 2026. Citations independently verified against the primary source September 10, 2026.

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